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Attacking Chevron: A Guide for Practitioners 
Anthony Caso 
INTRODUCTION 
This Article is meant to assist advocates who find themselves 
fighting against Chevron deference—the argument that courts 
should cede to the administrative agencies the task of 
“interpreting” the text of the Act of Congress that is claimed to 
support agency actions. After a brief discussion of how Chevron 
deference works, this Article examines the problem of separation 
of powers that is inherent in the deference doctrine. The Article 
then turns to how to attack the deference doctrine when it is 
asserted as a defense by agencies. 
Chevron deference is employed when an agency regulation is 
attacked as inconsistent with or beyond the scope of the federal law 
the agency is enforcing.1 Under Chevron, the courts first determine 
whether the statutory provision at issue is ambiguous and second 
whether the administrative agency’s interpretation of that statute 
is “reasonable.”2 So long as the agency has rule-making authority 
and the interpretation at issue was not developed in the midst of 
litigation over the disputed statutory test, the courts will give 
binding deference to “reasonable” agency interpretations.3 Under 
Chevron, when there is an ambiguity or gap in the legislative 
scheme, the court treats that ambiguity as a congressional 
delegation of power to the agency to fill the gaps and make policy to 
resolve the ambiguity.4 In other words, the courts hand over their 
authority to interpret law to the agency and assume Congress 
handed over its authority to make law to the agency. 
 
  Professor of Law, Dale E. Fowler School of Law and Director of the Constitutional 
Jurisprudence Clinic, Chapman University, J.D. 1979, University of the Pacific, 
McGeorge School of Law, M.B.A. 1999, Golden Gate University. I would like to thank the 
United States Justice Foundation, which sponsored the Separation of Powers Project of 
the Constitutional Jurisprudence Clinic, which made this conference and this Article 
possible. I would also like to thank Dr. John Eastman who worked so hard to recruit 
speakers for the conference and who, as Dean of the School of Law at Chapman invited 
me to come to Southern California to take over as the Director of the Clinic. 
 1 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 842–43 (1984). 
 2 See id. at 843–44. 
 3 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27, 229 (2001); Bowen v. 
Georgetown Univ. Hosp., 488 U.S. 204, 213 (1988). 
 4 Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
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The problem of Chevron deference was demonstrated in 
Justice Kagan’s concurring opinion (joined by Justice Breyer) in 
the recent decision in Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter and 
Paul Home v. Pennsylvania.5 The issue before the Court was 
whether the Department of Health and Human Services, the 
Department of Labor, and the Treasury Department 
(“Departments”) had authority under the Affordable Care Act to 
promulgate a regulation exempting employers with religious or 
moral objections from providing no-cost contraceptive coverage in 
the group insurance policy.6 Did Congress grant that authority to 
the Departments in the statute? Justice Kagan wrote that she 
could find no clarity in the statute on the question.7 
If I had to, I would of course decide which is the marginally better 
reading. But Chevron deference was built for cases like these. See 
Chevron U. S. A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 
U.S. 837, 842–843, 104 S.Ct. 2778, 81 L.Ed.2d 694 (1984); see also 
Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 301, 133 S.Ct. 1863, 185 L.Ed.2d 941 
(2013) (holding that Chevron applies to questions about the scope of 
an agency’s statutory authority). Chevron instructs that a court facing 
statutory ambiguity should accede to a reasonable interpretation by 
the implementing agency. The court should do so because the agency 
is the more politically accountable actor. See 467 U.S. at 865–866, 104 
S.Ct. 2778. And it should do so because the agency’s expertise often 
enables a sounder assessment of which reading best fits the statutory 
scheme. See id., at 865, 104 S.Ct. 2778.8  
The statute is not clear, in Justice Kagan’s view. Indeed, the 
statute says nothing about a requirement to provide no-cost 
contraceptive coverage nor the Departments’ authority, or 
requirement, to provide a religious exemption to such a 
requirement.9 Thus she “would defer to the Departments’ view of 
the scope of Congress’s delegation.”10 In this view, Chevron 
deference both does the job that Congress did not do (writing a 
clear statute) and the job the judiciary should do (interpret legal 
texts). In both instances, Chevron deference departs from the 
scheme of separated powers embedded in the Constitution.  
Chevron implements the vision of Woodrow Wilson, the 
father of modern administrative law. Wilson disputed the need 
for separation of powers and instead argued for administrative 
 
 5 140 S. Ct. 2367, 2397–400 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 6 Id. at 2372–73 (majority opinion). 
 7 Id. at 2397 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 8 Id. 
 9 Id. at 2373 (majority opinion). 
 10 Id. at 2400 (Kagan, J., concurring). 
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officials with “large powers and unhampered discretion.”11 
Chevron deference takes us a long way down the road to Wilson’s 
dream of administrators with “large powers and unhampered 
discretion.”12 Chevron deference, in Justice Kagan’s view, gives 
the administrator the “large power” to write into the law that 
which Congress left out, and the seemingly “unhampered 
discretion” to do so by excluding the judiciary from its job of legal 
interpretation.13 
First, this Article shows that the argument that Congress 
intended agencies to “interpret” the statute and “fill in the 
blanks” cannot be justified with reference to the text. Next, the 
Article demonstrates that separation of powers is a key 
structural element of the U.S. Constitution and that Chevron 
deference upends that structure of separated powers. The 
doctrine of deference allows administrative agencies to usurp the 
power of legislation, and it allows agencies to displace the courts 
as interpreters of congressional acts. Congress cannot delegate 
lawmaking any more than the courts can delegate their duty to 
decide cases or controversies. 
Much of this is not new but is intended to give the advocate 
the necessary background to make the arguments. All of this is 
prelude to consideration of what an advocate should do in order 
to overturn or limit Chevron. This Article proposes two tactics. 
First, insist on the exceptions. Much like Auer deference to an 
agency’s interpretation of its own regulations has been 
circumscribed by an ever-growing list of exceptions,14 Chevron 
deference can also be limited—some limitations have already 
been imposed by judicial decision. Second, the advocate should 
insist that the courts return to their job of statutory 
construction.15 Chevron only applies if the court finds the statute 
ambiguous after exhausting all of the tools of statutory 
interpretation. These tools of statutory construction do not allow 
deference to the agency where the meaning of a statute cannot be 
fixed.16 
 
 11 Woodrow Wilson, The Study of Administration, 2 POL. SCI. Q. 197, 213–14 (July 1887). 
 12 Id. 
 13 See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. 
Ct. 2367, 2397 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 14 Kisor v. Wilke, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2414–15 (2019). 
 15 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 (“The 
judiciary is the final authority on issues of statutory construction and must reject 
administrative constructions which are contrary to clear congressional intent.”). 
 16 ANTONIN SCALIA & BRYAN A. GARNER, READING LAW: THE INTERPRETATION OF 
LEGAL TEXTS 134 (2012) (“There are sometimes statutes which no rule or canon of 
interpretation can make effective or applicable to the situations of fact which they purport 
to govern. In such cases the statute must simply fail.” (citation omitted)). 
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Before discussing separation of powers, however, the Article 
discusses the question of whether Congress intended the courts 
to defer to executive agencies on questions of the meaning of 
legislative texts. That is, whether Chevron is a creature of 
legislative intent or one of judicial creation. 
I. THE MYTH THAT DEFERENCE FLOWS FROM CONGRESSIONAL 
INTENT 
The Supreme Court has often repeated the claim that 
Congress intended for the courts to defer to the judgment of 
agencies when interpreting a statute.17 This congressional intent 
is claimed to be found where Congress left a gap in the statutory 
scheme and gave rule-making authority to the agency.18 The 
Court has even described this as an “express delegation of 
specific interpretive authority” to the agency.19 The Court 
explained its thought process on the idea that Chevron deference 
was intended by Congress as follows: 
We accord deference to agencies under Chevron, not because of a 
presumption that they drafted the provisions in question, or were 
present at the hearings, or spoke to the principal sponsors; but rather 
because of a presumption that Congress, when it left ambiguity in a 
statute meant for implementation by an agency, understood that the 
ambiguity would be resolved, first and foremost, by the agency, and 
desired the agency (rather than the courts) to possess whatever degree 
of discretion the ambiguity allows.20 
The problem with this line of thought is that there is no 
reference to any actual statute or congressional text expressing 
such an intent.21 Professor Hamburger observed: “As a result of 
Chevron’s presumption from ambiguity, the courts have ended up 
in the peculiar position of basing their deference on statutory 
authorization while presuming such authorization from what the 
statutes do not say.”22  
Further, this theory of implied congressional intent forces 
the courts to ignore the one clear statement from Congress on 
who should interpret the statute.23 Section 706 of the 
Administrative Procedure Act provides: “To the extent necessary 
 
 17 See Chevron, 467 U.S. at 843–44. 
 18 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173–74 (2007); see also 
King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 485 (2015). 
 19 United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 229 (2001).  
 20 Smiley v. Citibank (S.D.), N.A., 517 U.S. 735, 740–41 (1996). 
 21 See id.; see also Philip Hamburger, Chevron Bias, 84 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 1187, 
1192 n.15 (2016). 
 22  Hamburger, supra note 21. 
 23  See id. 
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to decision and when presented, the reviewing court shall decide 
all relevant questions of law, interpret constitutional and 
statutory provisions, and determine the meaning or applicability 
of the terms of an agency action.”24 The phrase “decide all 
relevant questions of law” does not appear to be ambiguous.25 “It 
is emphatically the province and duty of the judicial department 
to say what the law is.”26 But Congress, in the Administrative 
Procedure Act, decided to remove any doubt on the question by 
specifying that the reviewing court is tasked with the duty to 
“interpret constitutional and statutory provisions.”27  
Rulemaking authority granted in a statutory scheme is often 
specific and reveals no intent to set up agencies as the final 
arbiter of the meaning of federal law. For instance, the Clean Air 
Act orders the Administrator of the Environmental Protection 
Agency to issue regulations prescribing air quality standards for 
designated air pollutants.28 Nothing is said about the EPA’s 
authority to interpret the statute. Sometimes the statute grants 
a broad-ranging authority to an agency. One example is found in 
the Communications Act of 1934 where Congress granted the 
Federal Communications Commission the authority to “prescribe 
such rules and regulations as may be necessary in the public 
interest to carry out the provisions of this chapter.”29 The 
rulemaking authority there is quite broad, but it says nothing 
about displacing the courts’ traditional function of interpreting 
the law.  
Congress did not leave much room for the courts to presume a 
contrary intent from statutory silence. If there was evidence of such 
an intent, there would be no basis for the courts to refuse to apply 
Chevron deference when an agency has failed to invoke the doctrine 
or has affirmatively waived it. But as Justice Gorsuch has noted,  
[the] Court has often declined to apply Chevron deference when the 
government fails to invoke it. See Eskridge & Baer, The Continuum of 
Deference: Supreme Court Treatment of Agency Statutory 
Interpretations From Chevron to Hamdan, 96 Geo. L. J. 1083, 1121-
1124 (2008) (collecting cases); Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive 
Precedent, 101 Yale L. J. 969, 982-984 (1992) (same); see BNSF R. Co. 
v. Loos, 586 U. S. ––––, 139 S.Ct. 893 (2019).30  
 
 24 5 U.S.C. § 706.  
 25  Id. 
 26 Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. 137, 177 (1803).  
 27 5 U.S.C. § 706; see Hamburger, supra note 21, at 1192 n.15 (citing Thomas W. 
Merrill, Judicial Deference to Executive Precedent, 101 YALE L.J. 969, 994–95 (1992)). 
 28 42 U.S.C. § 7409.  
 29 47 U.S.C. § 201(b).  
 30 Guedes v. Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, Firearms & Explosives, 140 S. Ct. 789, 790 
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Nor can the courts base continued application of Chevron 
deference on a theory of congressional acquiescence. There have 
been instances where the courts have found “Congress’ failure to 
disturb a consistent judicial interpretation of a statute” as some 
evidence of congressional intent.31 However, with Chevron deference 
we are not talking about the consistent interpretation of a single 
statute. It is certainly not an interpretation of the judicial review 
provisions of the Administrative Procedures Act. Nothing in the Act 
permits the implication that issues of statutory interpretation are 
committed to agency discretion. Precisely the opposite is true. The 
Act expressly commits those questions to the courts. Further, 
Chevron deference is a doctrine that is applied to every statute 
conferring authority on an executive agency to make regulations.32 
Chevron deference may be the preferred policy of the judiciary. 
There is no evidence, however, that it represents the intent of 
Congress.  
Finally, the Supreme Court in Mead ruled that Chevron 
deference was only available to regulations enacted pursuant to the 
notice and comment provisions of the Administrative Procedure Act 
(or Orders issued through APA adjudication).33 Yet the courts have 
not explained how this is consistent with the theory that Congress 
intended to leave the question up to the agency. If Congress is 
relying on agency expertise, what is the purpose of notice and 
comment procedures? Under the notice and comment provisions of 
the APA, the agency must publish notice of proposed rulemaking 
and then allow the public a period of time to comment on the 
proposal.34 The agency must then respond to the comments.35 If the 
agency decides to alter the proposal significantly, it must publish a 
new notice of proposed rulemaking starting the process all over.36 
The procedure is intended to ensure that the public, and regulated 
parties, have fair notice of and opportunity to comment on the 
regulation.37  
How does a requirement that the agency respond to public 
comments on a proposed regulation show that Congress desired to 
leave the policy up to the agency? The notice and comment 
procedural requirements are instead evidence that Congress does not 
entirely trust the agency’s decisions on policymaking and gap-filling. 
 
(2020) (mem.) (statement of Gorsuch, J.). 
 31 Monessen Sw. Ry. Co. v. Morgan, 486 U.S. 330, 338 (1988).  
 32 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 226–27 (2001).  
 33 See id. 
 34 5 U.S.C. § 553; Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 96 (2015). 
 35 Perez, 575 U.S. at 96. 
 36 See Long Island Care at Home, Ltd. v. Coke, 551 U.S. 158, 173 (2007). 
 37 Id. at 174. 
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These procedural requirements show that Congress did not leave the 
agency free to act on its own. Nothing in the APA demonstrates that 
Congress gave the agency the authority to regulate free of 
interference from the courts on the question of whether the 
regulation comports with the statute enacted by Congress. 
In any event, Congress has no power to confer either law-making 
power or judicial power on executive agencies.38 
II. THE PROBLEM OF SEPARATION OF POWERS 
Chevron deference has administrative agencies usurping the 
judicial role of interpreting legal texts and the congressional role 
of enacting legislation. If the legislation is so vague as to have 
multiple or no discernable meaning, the agency is effectively 
exercising Congress’ lawmaking power when it “interprets” the 
legislation. Agencies are left to fill gaps in the statutory 
framework and to make policy.39 This administrative action is 
further insulated from meaningful review when the judiciary 
defers to the agency interpretation. Chevron creates the perfect 
storm for destruction of separation of powers limits that are 
embedded in the structure of the Constitution. 
Separation of the powers of government is a foundational 
principle of our constitutional system. There can be little debate 
that separation of powers was considered an essential component 
in the plan of government by the Framers. Even before a national 
constitution was ever considered, the founding generation made 
sure that newly formed state governments were based on 
separated powers.  
In Virginia, the Fifth Revolutionary Convention approved 
the Declaration of Rights in June of 1776 that insisted that 
“legislative and executive powers . . . should be separate and 
distinct from the judiciary.”40 The new Virginia Constitution 
adopted that same month also required that the branches of 
government be “separate and distinct” and commanded that they 
not “exercise the powers properly belonging to the other.”41 
 
 38 John C. Eastman, The President’s Pen and the Bureaucrat’s Fiefdom, 40 HARV. 
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 639 (2017); see A.L.A. Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 
U.S. 495, 529 (1935); Panama Refin. Co. v. Ryan, 293 U.S. 388, 428–29 (1935). 
 39 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) 
(quoting Morton v. Ruiz, 415 U.S. 199, 231 (1974)). 
 40 VIR. DEC. OF RIGHTS (1776), reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 530 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 
2009).  
 41 CONST. OF 1776, reprinted in 8 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE RATIFICATION 
OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 533 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 2009). 
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The Massachusetts Constitution of 1780 contained a similar 
provision and added the purpose of separated powers “to the end 
it may be a government of laws and not of men.”42  
The denial of separated powers was among the complaints 
listed against the crown in the Declaration of Independence.43 
Justice Story notes that the first resolution adopted by the 
Constitutional Convention in 1787 was for a plan of government 
consisting of three separate branches of government.44  
The Framers and Ratifiers of the Constitution understood 
that separation of powers was necessary to protect individual 
liberty. In this, the founding generation relied on the works of 
Montesquieu, Blackstone, and Locke for the proposition that 
institutional separation of powers was an essential protection 
against arbitrary government.45 
These warnings against consolidated power resulted in 
structural separation of power protections in the design of the 
federal government.46 That design divided the power of the 
national government into three distinct branches, vesting the 
legislative authority in Congress, the executive power in the 
President, and the judicial responsibilities in the Supreme Court 
and lower federal courts.47  
The ratification debates demonstrate the importance of this 
separation to the founding generation. The argument was not 
whether to separate power, but whether the proposed 
constitution separated power enough.48 Fearing that the mere 
prohibition of one branch exercising the powers of another was 
insufficient, the Framers designed a system that vested each 
 
 42 MASS. CONST. OF 1780, reprinted in 4 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 445 (John P. Kaminski et al. eds., 
2009). 
 43 THE DECLARATION OF INDEPENDENCE paras. 9–10 (U.S. 1776) (noting obstruction 
of “the administration of justice” and the king’s power to make “judges dependent on his 
will alone”).  
 44 See 1 JOSEPH STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 519 (Melville M. Bigelow ed., Little, Brown, & Co., 5th ed. 1905) (1833). 
 45 See, e.g., MONTESQUIEU, THE SPIRIT OF THE LAWS 152 (Franz Neumann ed., 
Thomas Nugent trans., Hafner Publ’g Co. 1949) (1748); 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, 
COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 150–51 (William S. Hein & Co., Inc. 1992) 
(1765); JOHN LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT 82 (Thomas P. Peardon ed., 
Prentice-Hall, Inc. 1997) (1690). 
 46 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, at 267 (James Madison) (George W. Carey & James 
McClellan eds., 2001); THE FEDERALIST NO. 47, supra, at 249, 251 (James Madison); THE 
FEDERALIST NO. 9, supra, at 38 (Alexander Hamilton); see also Letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to John Adams (Sept. 28, 1787), in 1 THE ADAMS-JEFFERSON LETTERS 199, 199 
(Lester J. Cappon ed., 1959). 
 47 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 48 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 46, at 256 (James Madison).  
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branch with the power necessary to resist encroachment by 
another.49 Madison argued that what the anti-federalists saw as 
a violation of separation of powers was in fact the checks and 
balances necessary to enforce separation.50  
James Madison explained that a mere prohibition on 
exercising the powers of another branch of government was not 
sufficient: such prohibitions were mere “parchment barriers.”51 
Thus, the Constitution was designed to give each branch the 
power to protect its powers from the other branches.52 Because 
the three powers of government were not equal, the 
constitutional design does not have a pure separation of powers. 
To accomplish an equilibration of power, the Constitution gives 
each branch some limited role in the operation of the other 
branches.53 Thus, for example, the Executive wields the power to 
veto legislation, while the Judiciary wields the power to 
determine the meaning of laws and whether they comport with 
the Constitution.54 Leaving interpretation of laws to the 
lawmaking branch, according to Blackstone, is an invitation to 
“partiality and oppression.”55 Sensible toMindful of this danger, 
the Framers vested these powers in the judicial branch.56 
The Supreme Court has also recognized that Separation of 
Powers is the core structural principal of the Constitution.57 As 
Justice Kennedy explained:  
 
 49 Id. 
 50 Id.; THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 268–69 (James Madison); see also 
Mistretta v. United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989). 
 51 THE FEDERALIST NO. 48, supra note 46, at 256 (James Madison).  
 52 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 268–69 (James Madison).  
 53 Id. at 267–68. 
 54 At first blush, it appears that the checks and balances designed into the 
Constitution did not have the desired effect. However, then-Judge Kavanaugh noted that 
Chevron deference “encourages the Executive Branch . . . to be extremely aggressive in 
seeking to squeeze its policy goals into ill-fitting statutory authorizations . . . .” Brett 
Kavanaugh, Fixing Statutory Interpretation, 129 HARV. L. REV. 2118, 2150 (2016) 
(reviewing ROBERT A. KATZMANN, JUDGING STATUTES (2014)). The adoption of the 
Chevron doctrine empowers the Executive at the expense of the Legislature. If there is a 
failure in the system of checks and balances, it is found in the refusal of the courts to 
enforce the separation of powers.  
 55 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 58. 
 56 See FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46 at 268–69 (James Madison). 
 57 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 797 (2008) (“[P]ersonal liberty . . . is secured 
by adherence to the separation of powers.”); Metro. Wash. Airports Auth. v. Citizens for 
Abatement of Aircraft Noise, Inc., 501 U.S. 252, 272 (1991) (“The ultimate purpose of this 
separation of powers is to protect the liberty and security of the governed.”); Mistretta v. 
United States, 488 U.S. 361, 380 (1989) (“This Court consistently has given voice to, and 
has reaffirmed, the central judgment of the Framers of the Constitution that, within our 
political scheme, the separation of governmental powers into three coordinate Branches is 
essential to the preservation of liberty.”).  
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In recent years, perhaps, we have come to think of liberty as defined 
by that word in the Fifth and Fourteenth Amendments and as 
illuminated by the other provisions of the Bill of Rights. The 
conception of liberty embraced by the Framers was not so confined. 
They used the principles of separation of powers and federalism to 
secure liberty in the fundamental political sense of the term, quite in 
addition to the idea of freedom from intrusive governmental acts. The 
idea and the promise were that when the people delegate some degree 
of control to a remote central authority, one branch of government 
ought not possess the power to shape their destiny without a sufficient 
check from the other two. In this vision, liberty demands limits on the 
ability of any one branch to influence basic political decisions.58  
The doctrine of Chevron deference, however, breaches this 
core doctrine of separation of powers in two fundamental ways. 
First, it allows executive agencies to exercise Congress’s power to 
legislate Constitution vests the power to make laws solely in 
Congress and strictly limits how those laws can be made. Second, 
Chevron deference impermissibly allows executive agencies to 
exercise the Judiciary’s well-settled power “to say what the law 
is.”59  
III. CHEVRON DEFERENCE ALLOWS THE EXECUTIVE TO EXERCISE 
LEGISLATIVE POWER 
Chevron deference involves an explicit recognition that 
administrative agencies make “law”—that is to say, agencies 
promulgate substantive legal obligations (or prohibitions) that 
bind individuals. Pursuant to the doctrine, courts may not 
interfere with agency lawmaking so long as the congressional 
enactment is ambiguous, the agency has both expertise and 
rulemaking authority, and the agency’s interpretation is at least 
a possible interpretation of the law.60 The courts have recognized 
that agencies are clearly involved in lawmaking when they enact 
substantive rules that are subject to Chevron deference.61 There 
are two problems with deference in this regard. First, the 
Constitution assigns lawmaking exclusively to Congress. Second, 
reflecting the Founders’ fears over the power of legislative 
branch, the Constitution specifies a particular procedure through 
 
 58 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 59 Marbury v. Madison, 1 Cranch 137, 177 (1803). 
 60 There is no requirement for the agency construction of the statute to be the best 
interpretation. Indeed, under Chevron the agency is even empowered to subsequently 
change its mind about what the statute means. See Nat’l Cable and Telecomms. Ass’n v. 
Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 981–83 (2005). 
 61 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 233 (2001). 
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which laws are to be made.62 Agencies do not follow that 
procedure when promulgating regulations.63 
Article I, section 1, clause 1 of the Constitution provides: “All 
legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of 
the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of 
Representatives.”64 This is the first of the three “vesting 
clauses”65 that sets out the basic plan of government under the 
Constitution and that provide the framework for the scheme of 
separated powers. Powers vested in one branch under the vesting 
clause cannot be ceded to or usurped by another.66 
The legislative power is the power to alter “the legal rights, 
duties and relations of persons.”67 This is the same definition 
given to “substantive rules” adopted by administrative agencies. 
Section 551 of the Administrative Procedure Act defines the term 
“rule” as an agency statement that prescribes “law or policy.”68 
These are “laws” that impose “legally binding obligations or 
prohibitions” on individuals.69 It is difficult to see much space 
between agency “rules” and the “legislation” that Article I of the 
Constitution reserved exclusively to Congress.70 Responding to 
the point that “some administrative agency action—rulemaking, 
for example—may resemble ‘lawmaking,’” the Supreme Court 
noted that agency action will always be limited to mere executive 
administration of the laws “because . . . [the agency’s] 
administrative activity cannot reach beyond the limits of the 
statute that created it.”71 If the question is whether Congress has 
delegated a power reserved exclusively to Congress, the Chadha 
Court noted that the courts were available to ensure that 
administrative agencies adhered to “the will of Congress.”72 
Those checks were largely illusory before Chadha was 
decided. The idea of ensuring that agency activity “cannot reach 
beyond the limits of the statute that created it” requires a statute 
with definable limits. If courts cannot determine the limits of 
 
 62 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 63 See Administrative Procedural Act, 5 U.S.C. § 553 et seq. 
 64 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 1, cl. 1. 
 65 U.S. CONST. art. II, § 1, cl. 1; U.S. Const. Art. III, § 1, cl. 1. 
 66 E.g., Dep’t of Transp. v. Ass’n of Am. R.Rs., 575 U.S. 43, 67–68 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring).  
 67 See Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 952 (1983).  
 68 The Administrative Procedure Act, 5 U.S.C. § 551 et seq. 
 69 Perez v. Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 123 n.4 (2015) (Thomas, J., 
concurring). 
 70 See Hamburger, supra note 21, at 1194 n.21, 1196; Henry P. Monaghan, Marbury 
and the Administrative State, 83 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 5 (1983). 
 71 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 953 n.16.  
 72 Id. 
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congressional will, there is no standard for them to enforce.73 In 
J.W. Hampton, Jr., & Co. v. United States74 the Supreme Court 
came up with a theory that so long as Congress set down an 
“intelligible principle” for agency action, that was sufficient to 
avoid a conclusion that the Congress had impermissibly 
delegated its lawmaking power to the executive branch.75 
However, the idea that this doctrine requiring an “intelligible 
principle” would actually provide an enforceable norm was very 
short lived. Just four years after the J.W. Hampton decision, the 
Supreme Court ruled that a requirement for the agency to 
regulate in the “public interest” was a sufficient intelligible 
principle.76 These decisions stripped both “intelligible” and 
“principle” from the standard, leaving Congress free to delegate 
that which the Constitution explicitly vests in Congress and 
Congress alone.  
In any event, neither of the checks touted by the Chadha 
Court continue to exist under Chevron. Under Chevron, it is the 
agency that has the last word on whether the agency’s action 
reaches beyond the limits of the statute. The most the courts will 
do is determine whether the agency interpretation of the statute 
is “reasonable”—that is, whether the agency’s interpretation is a 
possible construction of the statute, though not necessarily the 
best reading. Further, the courts no longer ensure that agencies 
adhere to the will of Congress, since Chevron deference requires 
courts to defer to the agency’s determination of Congress’s will.77  
By taking the courts out of the role that the Chadha Court 
thought critical, Chevron deference invites the administrative 
agency to usurp Congress’s power to make law.78 Further, it 
 
 73 Id. 
 74 276 U.S. 394 (1928). 
 75 Id. at 409.  
 76 See N.Y. Cent. Sec. Corp. v. United States, 287 U.S. 12, 24–25 (1932); Nat’l Broad. 
Co. v. United States, 319 U.S. 190, 225–26 (1943). 
 77 Of course, the courts are only supposed to defer once they determine that the 
statute is ambiguous. This requires the courts to use all of the tools of statutory 
construction to determine the meaning of the law. See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys., Inc. v. 
Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004); FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 
132–33 (2000); Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 n.9 
(1984). If the statute remains ambiguous once all the tools of statutory interpretation 
have been exhausted, a different problem is presented. See Michigan v. EPA, 576 U.S. 
743, 762–63 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring) (“For if we give the ‘force of law’ to agency 
pronouncements on matters of private conduct as to which ‘“Congress did not actually 
have an intent,”’ we permit a body other than Congress to perform a function that 
requires an exercise of the legislative power. . . . It is the power to decide—without any 
particular fidelity to the text—which policy goals EPA wishes to pursue.”) (internal 
citations omitted). 
 78 Kavanaugh, supra note 54 at 2151. 
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invites Congress to increasingly delegate its lawmaking power to 
administrative agencies.79 The result in either instance is that 
agencies in the Executive branch of government combine 
lawmaking with law execution in a single office. This is 
something that the structure of the Constitution was designed to 
prevent.80 As the Supreme Court has noted on many occasions, 
this combination of powers in a single office is a threat to 
individual liberty.81 
To that end, Congress cannot delegate its lawmaking power. 
The text of the Constitution is clear that the power of 
legislation—at least as far as the Constitution permits legislation 
at all—is reserved exclusively to Congress.82 The Constitution 
further limits how legislation can be made. Congress’s power to 
make law can only be exercised by following a specific 
procedure.83 According to the text, Congress can only act 
pursuant to “a single, finely wrought and exhaustively 
considered, procedure”84 that includes bicameralism (the 
requirement that a measure be approved by both houses of 
Congress) and presentment (allowing the President the 
opportunity to veto the legislation).85 The Supreme Court 
recognized that these provisions might prevent Congress from 
acting in an efficient manner. However, “[c]onvenience and 
efficiency are not the primary objectives—or the hallmarks—of 
democratic government . . . .”86  
The system built by the founding generation was 
purposefully inefficient. Under the Constitution, the legislative 
branch is divided into two houses, each selected by a different 
manner.87 No bill can become law until it has been enacted by 
both houses of the Legislature and then presented to the 
President for approval.88 This is a cumbersome process but one 
that those who framed and ratified the Constitution thought 
necessary to preserve liberty.89  
 
 79 Michigan, 576 U.S. at 762–63 (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 80 Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 450–51 (1998) (Kennedy, J., 
concurring). 
 81 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46 at 268–69 (James Madison); see also 
Boumediene v. Bush, 533 U.S. 723, 172–43 (2008). 
 82 See U.S. CONST. art I, § 1, cl. 1. 
 83 See Rapanos v. United States, 547 U.S. 715, 750 (2006); Immigr. & Naturalization 
Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
 84 Chadha, 462 U.S. at 951. 
 85 Id. at 946–51. 
 86 Id. at 944. 
 87 U.S. CONST. art. I, §§ 2, 3.  
 88 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 7, cl. 2. 
 89 JAMES MCCLELLAN, LIBERTY, ORDER, AND JUSTICE 339 (Liberty Fund, Inc. 3d ed., 
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A unicameral legislative body would certainly have been 
more efficient, but most of the colonial governments had moved 
to a bicameral legislature by the time the Constitution was being 
drafted.90 The Framers were concerned that a powerful 
legislative branch at the federal level would be a threat to 
liberty.91 They had learned that it was nearly impossible to 
restrain the legislative power when vested in only one body.92 As 
James Wilson would later remark: “A single legislature is 
calculated to unite in it all the pernicious qualities of the 
different extremes of bad government.”93 
James Madison explained, “[i]n republican government, the 
legislative authority necessarily predominates.”94 The remedy 
was to split the legislative branch into two houses.95 This fit into 
the scheme of divided power meant to preserve liberty.96 By the 
time of the framing of the Constitution, the idea that the 
legislature had to be divided was a view held by “most persons of 
sound reflection.”97 It was for these reasons that the Constitution 
specified a “single, finely wrought and exhaustively considered, 
procedure” for enactment of federal law.98 
Deferring to agency “gap-filling” and “policy making,” 
however, allows executive branch agencies to “make law” without 
following this single, finely wrought procedure. There is no need 
of political compromise or consensus building. There is no 
procedure for deliberation and there is certainly no element of 
republican government. Law is not proposed by representatives, 
it is imposed by executive branch employees. 
 
2000) (1989) ("Speed, however, is not a virtue in the political process crafted by the 
Framers. The system is intended to promote careful deliberation, which is time-
consuming, to be sure, but necessary to build a consensus so that the decision finally 
made has broad support."). 
 90 See FEDERAL FARMER: AN ADDITIONAL NUMBER OF LETTERS TO THE REPUBLICAN, 
(New York, May 2, 1788) reprinted in 20 THE DOCUMENTARY HISTORY OF THE 
RATIFICATION OF THE CONSTITUTION DIGITAL EDITION 985–86 (John P. Kaminski et al. 
eds., 2009). 
 91 See JAMES WILSON, OF GOVERNMENT, THE LEGISLATIVE DEPARTMENT, LECTURES 
ON LAW 1791, reprinted in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 377, 377 (Philip B. Kurland & 
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987). 
 92 Id. 
 93 Id. 
 94 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 269 (James Madison). 
 95 Id. 
 96 See ST. GEORGE TUCKER, Of the Several Forms of Government, in VIEW OF THE 
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES WITH SELECTED WRITINGS 21, 48 (1999); see also 
THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 268–69 (James Madison). 
 97 JOSEPH STORY, 2 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, § 547 (1833), reprinted 
in 1 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 378, 378 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
 98 Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 951 (1983). 
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One argument for Chevron deference is that executive 
branch agencies are more politically accountable than the 
courts.99 There are two responses. First, the courts are not 
supposed to be politically accountable. They are supposed to 
operate outside of politics and render judgment on the matters 
brought before them.100 Second, executive agencies are not 
politically accountable. Rules cannot be changed simply because 
the individual occupying the Office of President has changed.101 
Further, it is unlikely that the President could control the 
behavior of administrative agencies at that fine of a level.102 Even 
if one were to assume that the President had direct, day-to-day 
control over all of the executive agencies (including the so-called 
“independent agencies” which are designed to operate outside of 
the three branches of government), that does not alter the fact 
that the agencies are making law outside of the Constitutional 
procedure. 
IV. CHEVRON DEFERENCE ALLOWS THE EXECUTIVE TO EXERCISE 
JUDICIAL POWER 
Article III, § 1 of the Constitution vests the “judicial power” 
in the “Supreme Court and in such inferior Courts as the 
Congress may . . . establish.”103 In a scheme of separated powers, 
the key to judicial power is the “interpretation of the law.”104 This 
is a power that must be separated from both execution and 
legislation. Quoting Montesquieu, Justice Story notes “there is no 
liberty, if the judiciary power be not separated from the 
legislative and executive powers.”105 The purpose of the judiciary 
is to stand as a neutral arbiter between the legislative and 
executive branches—a necessary check on the political branches 
of government.106 The separate judicial power allows the courts to 
 
 99 See Little Sisters of the Poor Saints Peter & Paul Home v. Pennsylvania, 140 S. 
Ct. 2367, 2397 (2020) (Kagan, J., concurring). 
 100 See THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 46, at 405–06 (Alexander Hamilton). 
 101 See Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Ass’n v. State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 463 U.S. 29, 42, 
48 (1983). 
 102 See City of Arlington v. FCC, 569 U.S. 290, 313–14 (2013) (Roberts, C.J., 
dissenting). 
 103 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. 
 104 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 46, at 404 (Alexander Hamilton); Perez v. 
Mortg. Bankers Ass’n, 575 U.S. 92, 119–20 (2015) (Thomas, J., concurring). 
 105 JOSEPH STORY, 3 COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION, § 1568 (1833), reprinted 
in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 200, 200 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
 106 THE FEDERALIST NO. 78, supra note 46, at 405 (Alexander Hamilton). 
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serve as “bulwarks” for liberty.107 This requires that judges have 
the power to “declare the sense of the law.”108 
The scheme for balancing power between the branches of 
government depends on each branch exercising the full extent of 
its power.109 In order to keep the political branches in check, the 
courts may not surrender their power to interpret the law to 
either of the political branches. The failure to exercise this duty 
would be an invitation to “partiality and oppression.”110 Each 
branch of government must support and defend the Constitution 
and thus must interpret the Constitution.111 The Courts may not, 
however, cede their judicial power to interpret the laws to the 
Executive.112 The judicial branch accomplishes its role by ruling 
on the legality of the actions of the executive and giving “binding 
and conclusive” interpretations to acts of Congress.113 Had the 
Constitution not assigned such a role to the judiciary as a 
separate branch, the plan of government “could not be 
successfully carried into effect.”114 
Chevron deference, however, alters this framework in a way 
that the separation of judicial from executive power is no longer 
enforced. It is no longer the exclusive province of the courts to 
interpret congressional enactments. Instead, the court now treats 
the existence of an “ambiguity” as meaning that Congress 
intended the agency, and only the agency, to interpret the 
statute. So long as the agency interpretation is “reasonable,” 
Chevron requires the courts to cede their judicial power to the 
executive and approve the agency interpretation. 
The Supreme Court took this line of argument to its logical 
extreme in National Cable & Telecommunications Association  
v. Brand X Internet Services.115 There, the court ruled that Chevron 
deference applied to the FCCs decision that cable internet providers 
did not provide “telecommunications service” as defined by the 
Communications Act, and thus were exempt from common carrier 
regulation.116 That part of the decision is not surprising. The 
 
 107 Id. 
 108 Id.; see Immigr. & Naturalization Serv. v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919, 944 (1983). 
 109 THE FEDERALIST NO. 51, supra note 46, at 269 (James Madison). 
 110 BLACKSTONE, supra note 45, at 58. 
 111 United States v. Nixon, 418 U.S. 683, 704 (1974).  
 112 See id. 
 113 WILLIAM RAWLE, A VIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES, reprinted 
in 4 THE FOUNDERS’ CONSTITUTION 195, 195 (Philip B. Kurland & Ralph Lerner eds., 
1987). 
 114 Id. 
 115 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967 (2005). 
 116 Id. at 977, 981. 
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Communications Act is a model of ambiguity, its provisions not 
anticipating the rapid evolution of broadband internet. The court was 
even willing to grant Chevron deference for a changed interpretation 
of the statute by the agency.117 The statute had not changed, the 
agency’s policy had changed. That, however, is more a problem of 
agency lawmaking as discussed in the prior section. The innovation 
introduced by Brand X is that the agency interpretation of 
Communications Act ran contrary to a Court of Appeals 
interpretation of the same provision in a prior case.118 The Supreme 
Court ruled that Chevron required the Court of Appeals to ignore its 
prior ruling interpreting the Communications Act and instead defer 
to the Commission’s new interpretation.119 In effect, the Supreme 
Court ruled that the agency had the power to overrule an Article III 
court on a question of statutory interpretation.120 The Court justified 
this by asserting that the agency was not engaged in statutory 
interpretation but rather “gap-filling.”121 
The Supreme Court had the opportunity to limit or overrule 
Brand X in United States v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC.122 At 
issue there was whether a subsequent regulation by the IRS 
could overrule a long-standing Supreme Court interpretation of 
the statute.123 The Court ruled no—but not because it amounted 
to interference with the judicial power. Nor was the problem that 
the prior ruling was from the Supreme Court, as opposed to the 
Circuit Court of Appeals, as was the case in Brand X. Although 
the Supreme Court had noted in its prior ruling that the statute 
at issue was “ambiguous,” that ruling was several decades before 
the Chevron ruling.124 It seems that the court was saying that 
“ambiguous” may mean something different in the Chevron era. 
Further, the court argued that the interpretation set by the 
Supreme Court in the prior ruling “had the better side of the 
textual argument.”125 However, Chevron deference rulings 
consistently note that the agency’s interpretation need not be the 
“best” reading of the statute.126 So long as the agency’s reading is 
“reasonable” the court must defer.127 Thus, it is hard to say what 
impact, if any, Concrete Home will have on Brand X. A close read 
 
 117 Id. at 981. 
 118 Id. at 982. 
 119 Id. at 982–83. 
 120 See id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 United States. v. Home Concrete & Supply, LLC, 566 U.S. 478 (2012). 
 123 Id. at 481–82. 
 124 Id. at 488–89.  
 125 Id. at 489. 
 126 Nat’l Cable & Telecomms. Ass’n v. Brand X Internet Servs., 545 U.S. 967, 980 (2005). 
 127 Id. 
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of the case reveals that there is nothing in the majority opinion 
that challenges the Brand X holding that administrative 
agencies have the power to overrule prior court decisions. 
A legislature cannot overrule a court, although it can enact a 
new law to avoid the effect of a ruling.128 Similarly, prior rulings 
have held that the executive branch was bound to follow a final 
judgment of a court.129 But Brand X holds that the executive is 
not bound at all by a judicial ruling on the interpretation of an 
Act of Congress.130 Under Brand X, if it is a statute dealing with 
agency power and the court can find an ambiguity, the agency is 
free to come to a conclusion different from that reached by the 
court and the court must accept the agency’s interpretation.131 
The Brand X decision makes Montesquieu’s worst fears of 
combined power a reality. An executive agency now has the 
power to make law (substantive rules that obligate individuals), 
enforce those laws, and to interpret its own authority to make 
those laws, free from judicial interference. The judicial, 
legislative, and executive powers are firmly held in a single hand. 
Under Chevron deference, the regime of separated powers 
has come to an end. The agency now makes law, is the ultimate 
interpreter of its authority to make law, and executes the law it 
makes. Whatever the Supreme Court’s motivation for developing 
this deference doctrine, it is clearly a doctrine that stands in 
opposition to the fundamental structure of the Constitution. 
Those who seek to resurrect the rule of separated powers 
have their work cut out for them. Chevron has been in place for a 
long time and some members of the Supreme Court are unwilling 
to overturn precedent—even in cases that they believe were 
wrongly decided.132 Still, there are two specific grounds of attack 
that can help rebuild the separation of powers structure of the 
Constitution. First, advocates can work on building exceptions to 
the Chevron deference doctrine so that deference becomes the 
exception rather than the rule. Second, advocates can focus on 
Step 1 of the Chevron analysis and insist that the courts actually 
use all of the tools of statutory interpretation before concluding 
that the law is ambiguous. Finally, if after all the tools of 
statutory construction have been used the law is still ambiguous, 
 
 128 See Plaut v. Spendthrift Farms, Inc., 514 U.S. 211, 218–19 (1995). 
 129 See, e.g., Zivotofsky v. Clinton, 566 U.S. 189, 197 (2012). 
 130 Brand X, 545 U.S. at 983–84. 
 131 Id. 
 132 See, e.g., June Med. Servs. LLC v. Russo, 140 S. Ct. 2103, 2133–35 (2020) 
(Roberts, C.J., concurring); Kisor v. Wilkie, 139 S. Ct. 2400, 2422 (2019). 
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the advocate should argue that Congress has failed to enact a law 
at all but has instead attempted an unconstitutional delegation 
of its lawmaking power to the Executive branch. 
V. ATTACKING CHEVRON – LIMITING EXCEPTIONS 
One way to limit a rule is build a fence of exceptions around 
its application. An example of this is another type of deference in 
Administrative Law that also raised serious separation of powers 
concerns—Auer deference. Under Auer deference, courts are 
required to give controlling deference to an agency’s 
interpretation of its own rules.133 With Auer deference, the entity 
that wrote the rule was also the only entity that could interpret 
the rule.134 Justice Scalia, author of the court’s opinion in Auer, 
later came to criticize the rule as a violation of separation of 
powers and called for overturning that deference doctrine.135 As 
the critiques mounted, the court began consciously cataloging the 
exceptions to the doctrine that had been noted in prior 
decisions.136 Finally, in the 2019 Term, it looked like there were 
enough votes to overturn Auer. In Kisor v. Wilkie, however, the 
majority narrowed Auer and reemphasized the requirement that 
reviewing courts exhaust the traditional tools of statutory 
interpretation before finding a sufficient ambiguity that might 
raise the issue of deference to the agency interpretation.137 Even 
then, the agency interpretation must be a reasonable one.138 
Advocates should explore a similar approach for limiting the 
scope of Chevron deference. The Supreme Court has already 
ruled that Chevron deference is not available when the agency 
interpretation of the statute is contained in an opinion letter.139 
The court expanded this limitation in United States v. Mead 
Corporation140 to rule that Chevron can only apply if Congress 
has granted rulemaking (or adjudicatory) authority to the 
agency.141 There must be evidence that Congress granted the 
authority to issue rules on the subject at issue that carry the 
force of law.142 Under these cases, an agency is not granted 
 
 133 Christopher v. Smithkline Beecham Corp., 567 U.S. 142, 155 (2012); Auer v. 
Robbins, 519 U.S. 452, 461–63 (1997). 
 134 Auer, 519 U.S. at 461. 
 135 Talk Am., Inc. v. Mich. Bell Tel. Co., 564 U.S. 50, 68–69 (2011) (Scalia, J., 
concurring). 
 136 See Kisor, 139 S. Ct. at 2414–18. 
 137 See id. at 2423. 
 138 Id. at 2422. 
 139 See Christensen v. Harris County, 529 U.S. 576, 587 (2000).  
 140 See United States v. Mead Corp., 533 U.S. 218, 254–56 (2001). 
 141 See id. at 229. 
 142 See id. at 231–32; see also Adams Fruit Co. v. Barrett, 494 U.S. 638, 649–50 
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Chevron deference if it does not have authority to issue rules (or 
binding legal rulings through adjudication) on the specific 
question for which it is seeking deference. Further, an argument 
can be made that deference should not be granted if the 
interpretation in question was not adopted as part of notice and 
comment rulemaking or adjudication under the APA. 
The Supreme Court has also shown reluctance to grant 
deference where the rule is one of “vast ‘economic and political 
significance’” in the absence of clear authority from Congress for 
the rule.143 Then Judge Kavanaugh framed this as the “major 
rules doctrine,” which denies Chevron deference for significant 
rules in the absence of clear congressional authorization.144 
Justice Breyer referred to these as “important . . . question[s]” 
that Congress was more likely to answer itself rather than leave 
to an administrative agency.145  
The “major rules doctrine” appears to have started with a 
case that should have been decided on the question of whether 
the agency interpretation was a reasonable one. In MCI 
Telecommunications Corp v. AT&T,146 the question was whether 
the FCC could interpret the term “modify any requirement” to 
allow the Commission to render voluntary a filing that the 
statute made mandatory. The Court held that the term “modify” 
in the statute could not be read to permit the FCC to eliminate a 
statutory requirement.147 As such, no deference was owed 
because the interpretation went “beyond the meaning that the 
statute can bear.”148 Although cited by the “major rules doctrine” 
cases, MCI is better situated as a case where the agency’s 
interpretation was not reasonable. Still, advocates can certainly 
use this case where the agency strays too far from the apparent 
meaning of the statute. 
A better case for the beginning of the “major rules doctrine” 
is FDA v. Brown & Williamson Tobacco.149 There, the Food and 
 
(1990). But see Barnhart v. Walton, 535 U.S. 212, 222 (2002) (finding an interpretation by 
an agency subject to Chevron deference even where it was not adopted through notice and 
comment rulemaking where it was a long-standing interpretation).  
 143 Util. Air Regul. Grp., v. EPA, 573 U.S., 302, 321, 324 (2014) (quoting FDA v. 
Brown & Williamson Tobacco Corp., 529 U.S. 120, 160 (2000)).  
 144 U.S. Telecom Ass’n v. FCC, 855 F.3d 381, 417 (D.C. Cir. 2017) (Kavanaugh, J., 
dissenting from denial of rehearing en banc). 
 145 Stephen Breyer, Judicial Review of Questions of Law and Policy, 38 ADMIN. L. 
REV. 363, 370, 383 (1986). 
 146 512 U.S. 218 (1994).  
 147 Id. at 231–32. 
 148 Id. at 229.  
 149 529 U.S. 120 (2000).  
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Drug Administration claimed authority to regulate tobacco 
products under the Food Drug and Cosmetic Act.150 That law was 
enacted in 1938,151 but the FDA did not discover its authority to 
regulate tobacco under the Act until 1996.152 Since Congress had 
adopted other regulatory programs to cover tobacco products, the 
court ruled that tobacco products were not within the agency’s 
regulatory authority.153 The court noted, “we are confident that 
Congress could not have intended to delegate a decision of such 
economic and political significance to an agency in so cryptic a 
fashion.”154  
This reasoning was also employed by the court in rejecting 
EPA’s attempt to use existing authority under the Clean Air Act 
to issue air pollutant standards in order to regulate greenhouse 
gases. The court noted that EPA’s interpretation of its authority 
under the Clean Air Act “would bring about an enormous and 
transformative expansion in EPA’s regulatory authority without 
clear congressional authorization.”155  
King v. Burwell156 is another case that can be included in the 
“major rules doctrine.” The Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act requires the establishment of an “exchange” (an 
insurance marketplace for the purchase of health insurance) in 
each state.157 If the state failed to create an exchange, the Act 
required the federal government to create the exchange for that 
state.158 Tax credits were available under the Act for the 
purchase of health insurance through “an Exchange established 
by the State.”159 The question before the Court was whether an 
exchange created by the federal government was “an Exchange 
established by the State” for purposes of the tax credit.160 The 
Internal Revenue Service promulgated a rule interpreting the 
statute as providing tax credits for purchase of insurance 
through a federally created exchange.161 
The Supreme Court declined to apply Chevron deference to 
the IRS rule because it raised a question of “deep ‘economic and 
 
 150 Id. at 125. 
 151 Id. at 131. 
 152 Id. at 125. 
 153 Id. at 161. 
 154 Id. at 160–61. 
 155 Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. 302, 324 (2014). 
 156 576 U.S. 473 (2015). 
 157 Id. at 483. 
 158 Id. 
 159 Id. 
 160 Id. 
 161 Id. at 484. 
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political significance.’”162 In such cases, the Court is hesitant to 
rely on an implied delegation to the administrative agency to 
resolve the issue.163 Here, the deciding factor for the Court was 
its finding that it was unlikely that Congress would delegate to 
the IRS a question regarding health insurance policy.164 Thus, 
where the question raises a question of “deep ‘economic and 
political significance,’”165 the advocate should explore whether 
the agency claiming the benefit of Chevron deference is in fact an 
expert on the particular question involved. While the IRS may 
have been expert on issues of tax policy and tax credits, it had no 
expertise on the program the tax credits were enacted to support. 
Without that policy background, the courts are unwilling to 
simply to defer to the agency. Even if the agency has expertise on 
the issue, the courts require a greater degree of clarity from 
showing that Congress intended to delegate resolution of the 
question to the agency. 
A related doctrine is constitutional avoidance. “Where an 
administrative interpretation of a statute invokes the outer 
limits of Congress’ power, we expect a clear indication that 
Congress intended that result.”166 The question in Solid Waste 
Agency of Northern Cook County v. United States Army Corps of 
Engineers was whether the Corps of Engineers could regulate an 
isolated body of water (not connected to any other body of water 
and completely within the boundaries of a single state)—a 
question that pushes the limits of the Congress’s powers under 
the Commerce Clause.167 The agency argued that migratory birds 
could view the body of water as a potential spot to stop (the 
“glancing duck test”)168, and that was sufficient to come within 
the Commerce Clause.169 The Court refused to resolve the 
question without a clear signal from Congress that it was 
pushing such a claim of jurisdiction.170 
The advocate can use these existing exceptions as a starting 
point for arguing for new exceptions and further limitations on 
 
 162 Id. at 485–86 (quoting 573 U.S. at 324). 
 163 Id. at 486. 
 164 Id. 
 165 Id. (quoting Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 U.S. at 324). 
 166 Solid Waste Agency of N. Cook Cnty. v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 531 U.S. 159, 
172 (2001). 
 167 Id. at 162–64. 
 168  Larry R. Bianucci & Rew R. Goodenow, The Impact of Section 404 of the Clean 
Water Act on Agricultural Land Use, 10 UCLA J. ENV’T. L. & POL'Y 41, 65 (1991). 
 169 Id. at 164. 
 170 Id. at 173–74. 
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deference. The real battle, however, ought to be over the issue of 
statutory interpretation. 
VI. ATTACKING CHEVRON—A RETURN TO STATUTORY 
INTERPRETATION 
Chevron deference only applies “if the statute is silent or 
ambiguous with respect to the specific issue.”171 Before a court 
can conclude a statute is ambiguous, however, it must first 
employ all the tools of statutory interpretation in an attempt to 
discern Congress’s intent.172 This requires the court to search for 
the statute’s meaning, rather than just attempting to find an 
ambiguity. While “clever lawyers - and clever judges - will always 
be capable of perceiving some ambiguity in any statute,”173 
Justice Scalia noted, “Chevron is . . . not a declaration that, when 
statutory construction becomes difficult, we will throw up our 
hands and let regulatory agencies do it for us.”174 
Statutory interpretation may be the most effective attack 
against an agency claiming the benefit of Chevron deference. 
However, such a strategy will require the advocate to master not 
only the statutory scheme at issue in the case, but also the major 
canons of statutory construction. 
Then Judge Kavanaugh argued that courts, when faced with 
a statutory construction question, should start off with the “best 
reading of the text” and then apply the canons of statutory 
construction.175 
When faced with such a question, one should start with the 
text of the specific statute at issue.176 The controlling 
presumption is “that a legislature says in a statute what it 
means and means in a statute what it says there.”177 Here, you 
need to look at the statutory scheme as a whole, and place the 
specific statute at issue in context.178 The “best reading” is 
arrived at by starting with the words of the statute, the context 
 
 171 Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984). 
 172 See Gen. Dynamics Land Sys. v. Cline, 540 U.S. 581, 600 (2004); Immigr. & 
Naturalization Serv. v. Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421, 446–48 (1987).  
 173 Abbott Lab’ys v. Young, 920 F.2d 984, 995 (D.C. Cir. 1990) (Edwards, J., 
dissenting) (emphasis in original).  
 174 Pauley v. Bethenergy Mines, Inc., 501 U.S. 680, 707 (1991) (Scalia, J., dissenting). 
 175 Kavanaugh, supra note 54, at 2121. 
 176 See Cmty. for Creative Non–Violence v. Reid, 490 U.S. 730, 739 (1989); United 
States v. Great N. Ry. Co., 287 U.S. 144, 154–55 (1932). 
 177 Conn. Nat’l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253–54 (1992). 
 178 See King v. Burwell, 576 U.S. 473, 492 (2015); Util. Air Regul. Grp. v. EPA, 573 
U.S. 302, 320 (2014). 
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of the statute in the statutory scheme, and the general rules of 
the English language.179 
A good resource for understanding the canons of statutory 
construction is Justice Scalia and Bryan Garner’s book, Reading 
Law.180 In addition to explaining the standard canons, the book 
provides an extensive bibliography of books and articles on 
interpretation of legal texts. For the advocate who needs to 
research statutory interpretation, this resource is a good starting 
point. 
There is one rule of statutory interpretation that is 
particularly relevant to the issue of Chevron deference. Chevron 
only applies when, after exhausting all of the tools of statutory 
construction, the statute remains ambiguous. Under Chevron, 
the courts give the agency the power to fix the meaning of a 
genuinely ambiguous statute; however, “[t]o give meaning to 
what is meaningless is to create a text rather than to interpret 
one.”181 
The Supreme Court, in Industrial Union Dept., AFL-CIO  
v. American Petroleum Institute,182 was confronted with a 
question of what exactly Congress authorized the Occupational 
Safety and Health Administration to do to protect workers from 
toxic substances. The statute at issue authorized the Secretary to 
promulgate health standards “which most adequately assures, to 
the extent feasible, on the basis of the best available evidence, 
that no employee will suffer material impairment of health or 
functional capacity even if such employee has regular exposure to 
the hazard . . . for the period of his working life.”183 Did the 
statute authorize OSHA to regulate for a “risk free” workplace or 
was the agency required to conduct a cost-benefit analysis on the 
regulation? If it is required to make a decision on the basis of a 
cost-benefit analysis, then how is the agency to draw the line? 
What cost is too high, and what benefit is too low?  
Then Justice Rehnquist, in his concurring opinion, noted 
that Congress “improperly delegated” to the Secretary of Labor 
how to balance costs and benefits of the regulation.184 As he 
explained, the statute was “completely precatory, admonishing 
the Secretary to adopt the most protective standard if he can, but 
 
 179 See Util. Air Regul. Grp., 573 U.S. at 327. 
 180 See SCALIA, supra note 16; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Interpreting Statutes in the 
Regulatory State, 103 HARV. L. REV. 405 (1989). 
 181 See SCALIA, supra note 16, at 134. 
 182 448 U.S. 607 (1980). 
 183 Id. at 612. 
 184 Id. at 672 (Rehnquist, J., concurring). 
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excusing him from that duty if he cannot.”185 According to Justice 
Rehnquist, the statute could not stand because it was a 
delegation that failed to provide an intelligible principle, failed to 
establish ascertainable limits on the agency’s power under the 
statute, and failed to provide congressional decisions on the 
“important policy choices” involved with the regulation.186 
No other member of the Court joined Justice Rehnquist’s 
opinion, but there is increased interest among some of the 
current justices in the nondelegation doctrine. The advocate 
should not shy away from including these arguments as part of 
his or her presentation to the court, especially when the 
statutory text is not amenable to clear interpretation after 
exhausting all of the tools of statutory construction. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Chevron deference is a judicially created doctrine. Although 
it purports to be based on implied delegations by Congress, there 
is nothing in the text of statutes that agencies implement or the 
Administrative Procedure Act that provides support for the 
deference doctrine. Indeed, the Administrative Procedure Act 
expressly calls on the courts, not the executive, to interpret 
statutes and resolve issues of law. 
Aside from its creation out of whole cloth, the deference 
doctrine upends the structure of separated powers that lies at the 
foundation of the Constitution. It allows executive agencies to 
exercise the lawmaking power that belongs exclusively to 
Congress as well as the judicial power that belongs exclusively to 
the judiciary. But advocates need not treat application of 
deference as a fait accompli. The purpose of this article is to give 
advocates the foundation in the arguments that can be made to 
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